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BEHIND CLOSED GATES: EVERYDAY POLICING IN DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA 
Sarah-Jane Cooper-Knock1 
ABSTRACT 
Studies of everyday policing in predominantly white areas in South Africa often focus on the 
spectacle of secured architecture and private policing services, concluding that the growth of the 
private security industry has created atomised units of residence that are alienated from the state. 
Such conclusions are important but incomplete: they do not look sufficiently behind closed gates 
to explore how private security is justified, utilised, supplemented, or avoided in daily life. In 
this article, I explore the everyday policing of theft and robbery in a predominantly white polic-
ing sector in Durban. I demonstrate that people have not simply transferred their dependence or 
allegiance from public to private policing. Instead, their approach to everyday policing straddles 
these two spheres, perpetually disrupts any simple dichotomy between them, and illustrates how 
all forms of policing are entangled in the wider inequalities and insecurities of post-apartheid 
South Africa. In making this argument, I highlight how residents remain reliant on the bureau-
cratic authority of the state police, distrustful of their employees who supposedly protect them, 
and appear far more willing to take matters into their own hands than many residents admit or 
imagine.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policing in South Africa is not now, nor has it ever been, the sole preserve of the state police 
(Gordon 2006). Whilst non-state actors who perform policing may not be authorized to do so by 
the state, their actions are not necessarily considered illegitimate by the country’s citizens. In this 
sense, the ‘monopoly of legitimate physical coercion’ that Max Weber (1998) believed to be the 
defining character of a state, does not exist. South Africa is, of course, not unique in this regard: 
the monopoly of legitimate force is ‘always an unattainable ideal’ and one that is ‘particularly 
tenuous in many post-colonial societies’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2006:297). State sovereignty 
may be undergoing erosion in new or different ways (Appadurai 1996; Goldstein 2008) but com-
plete state sovereignty was always a figment of the political imagination (Loader and Walker 
2004:224). Consequently, we must map everyday policing (Buur and Jensen 2004), not assuming 
that the state plays a central role in its delivery or regulation (Shearing and Wood 2003). The 
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emerging analytical picture can tell us much about citizens’ relationships with each other and 
with state institutions. 
In post-apartheid South Africa the field of policing is crowded and complex. The practice and 
legitimation of everyday policing has variously retained, reified and ruptured the constructed 
borders between public and private, state and citizen, legal and illegal (Buur and Jensen 
2004:143). Studies of law and social order in formerly black, Indian, and coloured townships of 
post-apartheid South Africa have tried to capture the breadth and complexity of everyday polic-
ing (for example, Buur 2006, 2008; Fourchard 2011; Jensen 2008a; 2008b; Minaar 2001; Oomen 
2004). In predominantly white areas, however, few studies have looked beyond private policing 
and securitized architecture,i creating the impression that affluent white citizens are engaged in a 
homogenous and complete retreat from the state into atomised households or elite estates, which 
systematically (and often violently) exclude criminal ‘Others’. This conclusion provides us with 
important but incomplete insights.  
To gain a more holistic impression of everyday policing in a predominantly white suburb, this 
article focuses more broadly on the everyday policing of robbery and theft. Of all the subgroups 
of crime, this is one of the most talked about and most feared in South Africa (Plessis and Louw 
2005), providing a relevant and accessible focal point for analysis. My fieldwork was conducted 
between May and September 2010, July and October 2011, and May and June 2013 in several 
policing sectors (sub-sections of the area for which a police station is responsible) across Dur-
ban. To protect interviewees who wished to remain anonymous, I use pseudonyms throughout 
and refer to the police sectors I study by the name of the police station under whose authority 
they lie. This is important to note, as the area referred to as ‘the Berea’ in Durban is far broader 
and more diverse than the single policing sector studied here. My analysis draws on 47 inter-
views from a non-probabilistic sample and fieldwork notes made in the five months spent living 
there. Although I interviewed white, Indian and black residents in the area, I focus here on white 
residents who still constitute the majority of the sector’s residents. I also utilize material (around 
100 additional interviews) from other research sites where appropriate.  
My analysis begins by exploring residents’ fear of crime, in a context where such fears are no 
longer an unproblematic metaphor for racial fear and prejudice (contra Judd 1994). Next, I turn 
to the narrative of Berea residents Geoff and Rachel, whose fears of crime were realized. I use 
their example to make four arguments. Firstly, the private industry surrounding crime has main-
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tained residents’ contact with the state, but this contact has not necessarily strengthened state-
citizen relations. Secondly, the same ‘standardized nightmare’ (Wilson 1951) about crime that 
drove residents to increase their private security, fuelled a distrust of the employees on whom 
they were meant to rely. Similar fears were also evoked by other domestic workers, shaping eve-
ryday policing in Berea. Thirdly, the ‘informal collectivization’ of private security complicates 
any ideas we have of privatized atomization in Berea. Finally, despite low participation in struc-
tured forums, direct action against crime was present in the Berea. 
FEAR IN THE SUBURBS 
The policing sector I studied lay immediately north-west of Durban’s city centre – a bustling hub 
of formal and informal trade that residents tended to avoid in favour of the growing range of 
malls constructed to serve Durban’s elite, many of whom were moving north along the coastline 
into exclusive, secured spaces. 
 
The neighbourhood explored below remained one of the more elite areas around the original cen-
tral business district. Those I spoke with in the Berea were white, middle-to-upper class residents 
who lived in homes ranging from flats in affordable blocks for young professionals to sprawling 
old houses replete with pools and smaller outhouses where live-in domestic workers used to (and 
sometimes still did) live. The sector’s more affluent residents could have afforded homes in elite 
gated estates like Mount Edgecombe (Durrington 2009), but were drawn by the sector’s schools; 
its lively streets with restaurants, cafes and galleries; and its proximity to the beach. In their 
minds, Mount Edgecombe was elite, but isolated. In contrast, they felt more engaged in the 
world around them and yet still firmly within the elite suburbs of the city. Thus when Simon, a 
resident in his forties, spoke of being ‘part of the world’, the ‘world’ he spoke of was, he clari-
fied, ‘the suburbs’.  
 
The areas surrounding this policing sector have seen substantial racial desegregation since 1994 
and become accessible to lower socio-economic groups. This sector, however, had seen less 
change but there had still been notable shifts in the race and class of the area’s residents. Imme-
diately after the transition, several people recalled a ‘firesale’ of houses, as residents moved 
north up the coast out of the city, or out of the country (James interview June 2010; Robert inter-
view July 2010; Barry interview July 2011). This gave many younger residents I interviewed the 
opportunity to acquire substantial properties. It had also provided Indian and black residents of 
all ages with a chance to buy property in this previously white suburb. Explicit discussions of 
racial shifts were, however, rare. In fact, any direct discussion of race amongst white residents in 
Berea was limited, particularly in interviews.  
 
It is not just white South Africans who avoided talk of race and racism during interview (Eras-
mus 2003). However, given the ‘racial structure’ of apartheid South Africa (Bonilla-Silva 
2009:9), white residents were unsettled by direct discussions of race that implicated them in 
questions of privilege or prejudice (Durrheim et al 2011). Their avoidance and suppression im-
plicitly recognised that whilst race is neither an immutable nor a monolithic category of identifi-
cation, it remained intimately entangled with everyday life in undeniable, uncomfortable but am-
biguous ways (Steyn 2001; Blaser 2009). Consequently, residents generally spoke in opaque, 
pejorative terms of demographic change ‘creeping’ towards the borders of their neighbourhood 
(Barry interview July 2011). It was in everyday conversations, as opposed to interviews, that 
more explicit opinions and anxieties emerged, hovering at the intersection of class and race.  
 
Despite ongoing references to ‘creeping change’, the housing ‘firesale’ had dissipated in recent 
years as, it seemed had these residents’ fear of crime. Many spoke of a time, after President 
Thabo Mbeki had ‘denied’ the problem of crime in 2004, when they felt their fear of it had 
peaked. A significant number of people’s friends and family had emigrated during Mbeki’s pres-
idency and talk at braais (barbeques), at the school gate, and over the dinner table was reportedly 
dominated by discussions of crime. More recently, however, residents claimed that this talk had 
declined, as people had acclimatized to life in post-apartheid South Africa. ‘Every conversation 
you used to have in this country was about crime’ explained James, a male resident in his forties, 
‘[but] this is one of the first conversations I have had about crime - and it is such a relief - in a 
long time’. 
 
However, the fear of crime and a preoccupation with avoiding crime had not disappeared. On the 
one hand, it had become normalised in practices of everyday life and on the other, it had been 
actively repressed. Authors have highlighted how crime is a politically correct way to talk about 
racialised fears and apartheid nostalgia (e.g. Judd 1994). However, the degree to which ‘crime 
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talk’ (Sasson 1995) could act as a shield for such sentiments has arguably waned since Mbeki 
and others dismissed those afraid of crime as ‘reactionaries’ and ‘racist’. Crime had remained 
less taboo than outright apartheid nostalgia (Hansen 2012) but there was a sense amongst these 
white residents that to ‘obsess’ (James interview June 2010; July 2013) about crime was to resist 
fully integrating oneself into post-apartheid South Africa. Many denied the hold that such fears 
had over them, and yet their words and deeds showed how such fears had become part of their 
daily lives. As Sophie, a resident in her twenties, explained: 
I think it is something that you just live with as opposed to being acutely aware of it. I 
think it is just always there… you just always carry on as if it is just about to happen to 
you at any point. Your house is always secure, your car is always locked... 
What people’s fears fixed on, primarily, was a criminal archetype that was young, poor, black, 
male, and violent. Two white residents I interviewed had been victims of robbery,2 having been 
held at gunpoint by black males, but not injured. The remainder had been subject to petty theft or 
house break-ins in their absence and did not know, with any certainty, who had committed the 
crime. Everyone, however, believed that they were potential victims of violent crime and shared 
similar criminal archetypes, recounting incidents amongst friends or in the local press as evi-
dence. The ‘objectivity’ of such fears is difficult to measure and, in many contexts, not the most 
important analytical issue at stake (Douglas 1983). Nonetheless, we can tentatively gauge the 
relative level of crime that Berea residents faced by exploring the differences in recorded crime 
between there and KwaMashu, a comparatively deprived former black township.3 In 2011, there 
were 6 recorded murders and 73 recorded acts of common robbery compared to 78 recorded 
murders and 112 acts of common robbery in KwaMashu.4 In other words, the threat of violent 
crime was notable but, nationally speaking, comparatively low: Statistics only partly explain why 
residents like Ben, a middle-aged interviewee, stated, ‘I think we are just brought up with this 
looking over your shoulder type of attitude’. 
 
White residents in Berea were, to borrow from Vincent Crapanzano’s (1986:45) analysis, ‘wait-
ing’. Focusing on Wyndal in the northern Cape in the 1980s, Crapazano studied white residents 
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who were in privileged positions of power and ‘paradoxically, in their privilege, victims of it’ 
(Crapanzano 1986: xiii). These individuals, he claimed, could not conceive of an alternative or-
dering of society to that of apartheid but knew that the current order of society could not last. 
Thus, Crapanzano argued, they were found ‘waiting’ – a state ‘marked by contingency—the per-
haps—and all the anxiety that comes with the experience of contingency’ (Ibid.). 
 
Clearly, too much has changed since Crapanzano’s study to apply his findings, in all their com-
plexity, to this case. However, in his article on gated estates in Durban, Matthew Durington 
(2009) asked whether these affluent residents in post-apartheid South Africa were also ‘waiting’ 
and, if so, waiting for what. Ultimately, he left the question open. In Berea, the concept of ‘wait-
ing’ is useful for highlighting how elite, white South Africans, whilst presenting themselves as 
‘part of the world’, realized (at some level) the incongruence of their livelihoods with current 
rates of unemployment and economic deprivation in the historical context of apartheid. For resi-
dents, violent crime posed the most immediate threat to this life but fears of broader social, eco-
nomic and political change also exacerbated the ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens 1991) at the 
heart of ‘waiting’ (Ballard 2005; Lemanski 2004). 
 
One of the most obvious manifestations of ‘waiting’ was that residents became hyper-vigilant, 
scanning the streets for would-be attackers. In keeping with the discussions on race above, many 
implied rather than described the characteristics of ‘suspicious’ characters in their area. Alistair, 
for example, was a resident in his forties, who claimed that he could spot suspicious characters 
because he knew his neighbours: ‘You will know who is not meant to be in the area before he 
does something… All of a sudden there is someone hanging around and you will know, “hang on 
that is not a maid or a worker”, you will say “guys let’s investigate”’ (Alistair interview June 
2010). Alistair’s initial reference point was his neighbours (who were predominantly Indian or 
white and relatively affluent) but his concerns rested on those who looked like ‘maids and work-
ers’ - that is to say, those who were predominantly black and relatively poor – but not employed 
on the street. These figures, he concluded, were ‘not meant to be in the area’: having no obvious 
connections to residents in the neighbourhood they were assumed to have malevolent intentions. 
They were ‘matter out of place’ and, therefore, dangerous (Douglas 1960). 
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Within white residents’ imaginaries of crime, such figures were ever-present in the suburbs, 
looking for the chance to commit an opportunistic crime or monitoring people’s homes to ascer-
tain their daily routines and plan crimes around them. As Rebecca, a resident in her sixties, ar-
gued: ‘They watch your moves, they know exactly when you go out, which house has nobody in 
attendance during the day… They sit. And, if there is that facility where they can just sit and 
watch innocently, that is where they will hit’. The criminal gaze Rebecca and other white Berea 
residents described was all encompassing. Like prisoners in Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, who 
were rendered visible to guards that they could not themselves see, residents felt they ‘must as-
sume ubiquitous surveillance [and] that they may be under inspection at any time, day or night’ 
(Elmer 2012:23). However, whereas Bentham’s watch guards were always invisible, suspicious 
characters were deemed to be both a visible and invisible presence. Understanding residents’ 
fears, and how these were entangled in their broader sense of being and belonging in post-
apartheid South Africa, provides us with a foundation from which to explore the everyday polic-
ing strategies that emerged when residents became victims of crime.   
 
A CONVERSATION WITH GEOFF AND RACHELii 
Geoff and Rachel are middle-aged white South Africans who live in a detached house on a rela-
tively quiet road in Berea. As is the case for most residents in the area, Geoff and Rachel’s house 
is protected with a gate, fence, and armed security response and they also have household insur-
ance for their possessions.  
In December 2010, family members visited Geoff and Rachel to celebrate Christmas. One morn-
ing, whilst the family was sleeping, two men broke into the house and began stealing their pos-
sessions. When the thieves disturbed Rachel, she woke Geoff. Realizing that the occupants were 
awake, one man jumped over the back fence, whilst the other hid under the dining room table. As 
Geoff recounts, ‘I accosted him with a chair… Basically we arrested him… He did put up a fight 
but at that point he was under the table and I laid into him with a chair… There was blood all 
around the place’.  
Having placed the thief under citizens’ arrest, Geoff phoned his security company. Hearing 
screams from the house, his neighbours shouted to the family, offering their help. Geoff instruct-
ed them to stay at home and call their security company. Acceding to his request, the neighbours 
phoned both their private security company and the police. It was their private security firm that 
responded first, followed by the police, while Geoff and Rachel’s private security company went 
to the wrong address.  
Entering the property, their neighbours’ private security guards took over from Geoff - who was, 
by that point, pinning the intruder under the table with a chair - and handcuffed the suspect. Be-
fore the police arrived to relieve the private security guards, Rachel recalled that the suspect 
‘proceeded to tell us that ten rand of the money in his wallet was his, and that that was his cell 
phone so we duly gave him back his ten rand and his cell phone. One has to be extremely careful 
to remain exactly on the right side of the law’. 
Whilst Geoff and Rachel both recalled that the police responded relatively promptly, they were 
frustrated with their apparent inability to write a statement. ‘[I] can accept that… the police are 
not going to be as effective as I would like to protect me, so I pay the security company’, Geoff 
argued, ‘But when I do need the police to be involved, I need them to be competent to take the 
statement… And the person cannot take dictation.’  
After recounting his story to me, Geoff reflected, ‘Although…I do not see myself as a vigilante, I 
did attack and arrest this guy who was in my house’. In that way, he claimed he was similar to 
other neighbours who had been victims of crime. Nonetheless, Geoff argued that people rarely 
used violence against criminals in Berea because the constitution ‘protect[ed] victims and perpe-
trators… you darenʼt take the law into your own hands because you are going to end up in 
Westville prison’iii. 
In this instance, the police already had their suspect for the attempted robbery. Nonetheless, 
Geoff and Rachel reported that there were difficulties securing a prosecution. The docket that 
included the suspect’s past crimes was lost (mistakenly or otherwise) and so, whilst he should 
have been sentenced to five years, two years of his sentence were suspended. Geoff and Rachel 
believed a conviction had been secured not because of the police but in spite of them. Thus, sev-
eral months later, when a guest staying at their house had his mobile phone stolen from a jacket 
in their back room, the couple encouraged him to report the case in order to obtain a case number 
for his insurance claim. As Geoff explained: ‘it was just really reported for the purpose of insur-
ance. I think there is really no expectation [when] something is stolen that the police will actually 
recover it’. 
9 
 
Following the robbery, Geoff and Rachel changed their security provider. They also attended a 
meeting of their local Community Police Forum (CPF), having heard of its existence through a 
flier. These forums are interfaces between the police and local residents (the Berea CPF is dis-
cussed in more detail below). Whilst Geoff and Rachel found some of the information gleaned at 
the meeting interesting, it was not useful enough to make them regular attendees. They also re-
sisted the CPF’s attempts to ‘educate’ citizens on crime avoidance:  
Rachel: What has really been getting up my nose is that the general population has been 
[told], you must be more aware, you must take care, you must do this…you must do that, 
and when a crime occurs, basically the police are not terribly proactive. And I mean we 
do pay our taxes… 
  
‘I WENT THROUGH THE MOTIONS’: PROCEDURAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PO-
LICE 
Geoff had low expectations of the police that were only confirmed by his interaction with them. 
As noted above, he believed his intruder’s conviction was secured despite the actions the police 
took. Research by the Law Commission confirms that his case was highly unusual in securing 
any conviction. In their longitudinal study following cases committed in 1998, only 3.57% of 
robberies with aggravated circumstances committed in Durban ended in a conviction; 88.37% 
never made it to court (SALC 2000:29).iv  
Geoff’s criticisms focused on the bureaucratic behavior of the police: he had sought to engage 
the SAPS in their administrative capacity, not their protective or investigative capacity. He be-
lieved the police were useful for opening cases, writing statements, issuing case numbers, and 
passing dockets to the courts. In one sense, this is a remnant function; the bureaucratic remainder 
of a wider, more active role for the police. However, record keeping is also a key ‘language of 
stateness’ in and of itself (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:21), as the country’s obsession with crime 
statistics demonstrates (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). Whilst the state provided services 
from refuse removal to road maintenance that made Geoff’s daily life possible, he felt that his 
most tangible, personal engagement with the state was driven by his need to access the defini-
tive, official record of events, which the state still held. ‘Most often one’s interaction with the 
state is administrative’, he reflected, ‘…we get our driver’s license, we get our passport. That is 
when it feels like you are engaging with the state’ (Geoff interview June 2013). Ultimately, for 
Geoff, the police had failed to behave in a state-like fashion because they were administratively 
incompetent. He might have avoided the police entirely at this point had he not needed their case 
number for his insurance claims, to validate his claims to victimization (Cooper-Knock and Ow-
en 2014).   
Many residents I spoke with echoed Geoff’s experience. In the words of Lawrence, a middle-
aged Berea resident, they ‘went through the motions’ of reporting to the police purely to access 
their household insurance: they had ‘no expectation’ of seeing a successful investigation and 
conviction (Lawrence interview July 2010). This drives us to look more closely at the diverse 
ways that the expanding private industry around crime affects connections between citizens and 
the state. Certainly, the rise of private security per se and the growth of gated estates with their 
own internal, privatized governance has loosened the bonds between privately ensconced citizens 
and the state (Ballard 2004; Durrington 2006, 2009; Hook and Vrdoljak 2002). However, those 
who had private insurance were locked into contact with the state even as they retreated from it: 
they were forced to ‘go through the motions’ of being a citizen. 
In this policing sector, though, contact between residents and the police was fraught with ambi-
guities: were the police sometimes unable to perform their duties due to a lack of human and 
physical resources? Or were they unwilling to do so due to laziness, corruption or racialised re-
sentment? It was rare for residents to definitively know what drove police success or failure in 
any one instance. The rationalizations they made, however, indicate how they ‘read’ the police as 
an institution, and the state more generally. Geoff and Rachel believed that police incompetence 
was tied to poor education and high levels of corruption. Such critiques often made implicit and 
explicit reference to the class differences between these affluent citizens and local police offic-
ers. Others, however, emphasized the importance of race in shaping poor performance: black po-
lice, they argued, would seek to protect black suspects, ‘go slow’ when serving non-black com-
plainants, and demand bribes from, or prosecute, non-black citizens where possible.v For several 
Berea residents, this apparent racialization of state services was understood as retribution for 
apartheid (See also Burger Allen 2003). Lorna, for example, was a resident in her fifties who had 
been brought up in the area and considered herself to be politically liberal. Like Lawrence and 
Geoff, Lorna reported crimes to the police for insurance purposes only. She argued:  
I have witnessed friends of mine [having] interactions with the police force and I promise 
you, they treat us like shit… it is a retaliation…And I think it is still the anger and the 
heritage of, ‘Where is your dompas?vi’ ‘Get off the street’… Anything [they can do] they 
are going to do. Of course they are. It is a retaliation. (Lorna interview July 2010) 
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Thus, residents’ need to gain a case number for their insurance may have cemented the police’s 
bureaucratic authority and secured their on-going contact with the state. However, as Allport’s 
(1954) ‘contact hypothesis’ highlights, contact itself can either exacerbate or allay prejudice and 
tension: what matters is the context in which this contact takes place. For residents in Berea, con-
tact with the police often reinforced their sense of frustration with, or alienation from, them 
(Loader 2006).  
 
EMPLOYEES IN BEREA: BETWEEN PREDATOR AND PROTECTOR 
Like Geoff and Rachel, most residents I spoke with in Berea lived in ‘fortified cells’ (Davies 
1992:156), surrounded by defensive architecture. Many also employed an armed security re-
sponse service or a permanently stationed guard. Residential private security in South Africa has 
its roots in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when commercial provision was encouraged by an 
increasingly beleaguered apartheid state (Shearing and Stenning 1981:501, Baker 2002).vii How-
ever, it was after apartheid that the industry mushroomed (Schonteich 1999:xx). In recent years, 
this rapid expansion has continued: security businesses increased by 18.35% between 2010 and 
2011, and registered security officers increased by 5.13% in the same period (PSIRA 2011). Be-
rea residents argued that a fear of crime drove their substantial investment in private security. 
However, as argued above, crime is a ‘polyvalent’ category (Buur 2003) and contained within 
this stated fear were broader feelings of exposure, danger and dislocation that had accompanied 
South Africa’s new dispensation (Ballard 2004; Lemanski 2006:746).viii  
Although the different constellations of private security employed in this sector had varying ef-
fects on those living in and around them (Durrington 2009) they all functioned on the basis of 
exclusion. Where these private security measures spilled into public spaces, those who fitted 
South Africa’s dominant criminal archetype (i.e., young, poor, black, and male) found their con-
stitutional right to freedom of movement downgraded to a negotiated privilege. Guards described 
how they prevented anyone without a ‘purpose’ or ‘reason’ from entering or remaining in a pa-
trolled area (Sifiso interview May 2013; Fieldwork Notes: July 2011). In practice, this amounted 
to the exclusion of all those who lacked pre-existing ties of sociality or service to local residents: 
‘Purpose’ and ‘reason’ were ultimately not self-defined terms. Where people were suspected of a 
crime, or resisted removal, their right to ‘security of the body’ also became negotiable (Sifiso 
interview May 2013; Ronald interview June 2013, see also Holston 2008). A comprehensive lit-
erature has documented this erosion of substantive citizenship (e.g., Berg 2010, Samara 2005). 
Here, I pursue a different analytical track by analyzing employer-employee tensions, and their 
consequences for everyday policing. Starting with private security guards then moving to domes-
tic workers I argue that, framed by race and class, employers saw their employees as potential 
objects and agents of policing. 
Private security guards occupied a paradoxical space in the imaginations of Berea residents. On 
the one hand, private security was everything that the police were not: a spectacle of elite, tech-
nological professionalism.ix As David, a middle-aged entrepreneur, stated, they ‘looked the part’ 
(David interview June 2011). On the other hand, the groundwork of private security was usually 
performed by unskilled, low-paid labour. The demographic profile of private security guards dif-
ferentiated them from their employers and overlapped (in whole or part) with the criminal arche-
type they were employed to dispel. For many white residents in Berea, this difference produced a 
fear that hovered at the intersection of race and class, manufacturing distrust and complicating 
their reliance upon those they had employed (Burger Allen 2003; Disurweit 2007; Durrington 
2009). Whilst residents paid for private security operators, some feared that their allegiances lay 
elsewhere. Highlighting the role of race in these fears, a manager from one of Durban’s main 
private security firms stated:  
I suppose it is always at brass tacks level… [about] race... One of the realities of the 
crime in South Africa is that...black people are the criminals. But now you have got a 
black man that is also responding to you and is he [a criminal]?… Do you trust your se-
curity company? Do you trust the reaction ofﬁcer?  Now he is coming to my house but 
the guys who broke in, are they not his friends? Especially when they are speaking a dif-
ferent language. Are they talking about me? Are they talking to the maid? (Isaac inter-
view June 2010) 
Thus, private security was a terrain on which racial and class-based fears were iterated rather 
than escaped. The act of commercialization itself also exacerbated residents’ fears. Private secu-
rity was seen as a ‘big business’ whose market relied upon the continuation of the very crime and 
insecurity it promised to fight, producing perverse incentives (Peter interview June 2010).  
Consequently, suspicion and muttered accusations permeated exchanges with security personnel. 
Because any evidence linking private security guards to crimes was often circumstantial at best, 
these concerns were not taken to the police. Rather, residents either chose to continue this suspi-
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cious reliance, making it one of many daily relationships they maintained that were quietly 
fraught with ‘race trouble’ (Durrheim et al 2011) and class-based anxiety, or they terminated 
their contract. Lorna, for example, chose the former route. During her fiftieth birthday celebra-
tions, she had mistakenly triggered her burglar alarm, activating her armed response. The re-
sponse guard, she claimed, had surveyed a roomful of open presents. When her house was 
robbed the following day, she held him responsible. The problem with security guards, she 
claimed, was systemic: ‘security companies would definitely be my question mark. Definitely. 
Definitely. I think that a lot of what happens is through the security companies’ (Lorna July 
2010). Subsequently, Lorna maintained her contract with the same company but lessened her re-
liance on these employees. As she explained, ‘I never put [the alarm] on. I never put it on. My 
dogs are better than anything’ (Ibid).  
Distrust was not the only reason, however, that private security could become little more than a 
facade. John, a resident in his sixties, had an armed response contract, ‘burglar guards’x on his 
windows and doors, and an electric fence, but never activated the alarm or the fence because he 
found them inconvenient (John interview August 2010). Instead, as I explore in more depth be-
low, he preferred to try and negotiate with anyone who broke into his property. What Lorna and 
John’s cases both demonstrate is the importance of looking beyond a private security aesthetic to 
uncover the lived complexity of everyday policing choices. Residents in Berea, it seems, were 
capable of ‘going through the motions’ with both private and state providers of policing. 
Private security companies were not the only employees that operated in and around the resi-
dences of Berea: most households also hired domestic workers. The latter were not primarily en-
gaged to provide policing but they were drawn into everyday policing in two senses. Firstly, to 
an even greater degree than private security guards, domestic workers knew the intimate spaces 
of people’s homes. In the midst of their daily work routines and their personal lives, they were 
assumed to know of potential opportunities for crime and potential criminal threats. Consequent-
ly, residents believed that they could act as informers for their employers or for local criminals. 
As such, residents were keen to ‘recruit’ domestic workers to assist in everyday policing. This 
logic underlay the establishment of ‘Maid Watch’ by the local neighbourhood watch, who orga-
nized ad hoc meetings between themselves, local domestic workers and the police to ‘educate’ 
and ‘train’ these employees, on the understanding that, ‘when you go off to work [domestic 
workers] are there at your house. So they notice what happens in the day. They sit on the road. 
To get their buy-in and support [is] to know what happens’ (Peter interview June 2010).xi Con-
versely, the same logic also triggered suspicions that, when a house break in occurred, domestic 
workers had provided ‘inside information’ to the criminals in question although evidence sup-
porting these accusations was circumstantial at most (Duncan interview July 2010).  
The second sense in which domestic workers were drawn into everyday policing was as direct 
suspects of theft. Sometimes evidence was, again, circumstantial. However, some residents had 
proof that their employees had stolen from them on a small scale, taking things they ‘knew we 
would not miss’, from boxes of cereal to fur coats (John interview August 2010; Sally interview 
August 2011). Residents were often conflicted about policing this level of crime given the con-
text of domestic work in South Africa. As Cock’s (1980) study demonstrates, relationships be-
tween white residents and their domestic workers were amongst the most exploitative in apart-
heid. Since 1994, this form of employment has continued to be economically unrewarding and 
fraught with racial tensions that are rarely vocalized but often present (Durrheim et al 2011:182; 
Ally 2009).  
This wider context complicated the framing and tackling of petty theft. Across Berea, residents 
debated the causes of the country’s crime, which were variously understood in psychological, 
racial, and economic terms, being fed by the country’s vast inequality. In such conversations, 
economic inequalities could be expressed in general, abstract terms, which lessened any sense of 
responsibility these affluent residents might feel for the current status quo. Residents were, how-
ever, completely responsible for setting the pay and conditions for their domestic workers, and 
petty theft within the home could be read as a reaction to the poor wages they offered. As 
Phumzile, a domestic worker, claimed, ‘it is good to be satisfied with your salary, if you are not 
satisfied [you]… will think I will rather pay myself… I will come back later and take that [item 
from the house]’ (Phumzile interview June 2013). Employers across the sectors I studied in Dur-
ban, of different races, acknowledged this connection between meager wages, poor working 
conditions and petty theft, arguing that ‘people who have no intention to steal would steal if you 
are rude and disrespectful… and paid a pittance’ (Shemi interview June 2013).  
This framing made residents less likely to tackle petty theft directly. Sally, for example, was a 
resident in her thirties who had recently realized that her maid, Buhle, was taking food from her 
cupboards. Defending herself as an employer, she insisted that Buhle was paid reasonably sent 
home with ‘ridiculous amounts [of food] each week’. Nonetheless, she accepted that Buhle’s 
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wages were still insignificant in comparison to her income and expenditure, and accepted theft as 
a morally justifiable form of informal redistribution: 
You are giving her 2000 Rand a month, which is less than what your car costs you in re-
payments and she has to run her whole family on that. Of course she is going to take un-
wanted food out of the cupboard. (Sally interview August 2011) 
 
In summary, in this section we have seen the ways in which the question of difference between 
employers and employees shaped everyday policing in Berea. This might make employees more 
or less likely to be relied upon for policing, and more or less likely to be policed, as the example 
of petty theft amongst domestic workers demonstrates. The broader conclusion emerging here is 
that a distrust of state policing does not equate to a trust in policing alternatives. 
 
‘THERE IS NO COMMUNITY SHARING’: THE INFORMAL COLLECTIVIZATION OF 
PRIVATE SECURITY 
When Geoff and Rachel were in trouble their neighbours had called their own private security 
company to come to the scene. This could be termed an act of ‘informal collectivisation’.xii Alt-
hough many residents I spoke with would agree with Peter, the local neighbourhood watch 
chairperson, that ‘there is no community sharing’ of security measures on the Berea, there had 
been several acts of informal collectivization both in this sector and elsewhere (Peter interview 
June 2010). In his study on policing in Africa, Bruce Baker (2002:31) argues that the terms ‘ 
“public” and “private” get confused’ when public officials act outside the collective public inter-
est’. Likewise, in Berea, the individuated logic of private security was blurred when it was made 
accessible to those outside the strictly contractual relationships involved. 
There were various ways that private security could be collectivized that, in turn, required vary-
ing degrees of consent and proactivity from those paying for and delivering private services. At 
minimum, informal collectivization emerged as a classic free-rider problem. For example, fol-
lowing a brutal murder on their street, Sylvia had convinced a large proportion of residents to 
contribute to a 24-hour unarmed guard service. Whilst these guards physically responded to indi-
vidual incidents, their key power, in Foucault’s words, was ‘based not on physical coercion but 
on a more subtle and pervasive form of coercion that draws its power from surveillance’ (in Berg 
2010:289). Although physical reactions were alienable to contributors, this surveillance power 
was not, creating quiet tensions between the ‘bad ‘uns’ who were free-loading and ‘good ‘uns’ 
who were not (Sylvia interview July 2010). 
In many cases, however, informal collectivization was more complicated. Tom and Sarah, for 
example, lived at the tail-end of a T-junction in Berea. The road that intersected with theirs had 
hired a private security guard to watch the street. Tom and Sarah did not contribute to the service 
(approximately £110 per month) because their house was not visible from the guard hut. The 
couple had two young children and employed Cindy, a live-in maid, to help with child care and 
the upkeep of the house. Innocent, the private security guard who worked the day shift, often 
came to speak with Cindy in his breaks and during his patrols (Tom July 2011). One afternoon, 
when Innocent was looking for Cindy, he saw two men trying to lift Tom and Sarah’s security 
gate off its hinges. He approached their property to confront the men, phoning Cindy as he did 
so. She called Tom and their armed response firm. Realizing that they had been seen, the sus-
pects escaped (Tom interview July 2011).  
Nancy, who lived two doors down from Tom and Sarah contributed to Innocent’s wages.  The 
two households were acquainted, largely because Nancy was civically active and worked to raise 
awareness about crime in the area, sending email alerts to them and other residents. When I 
spoke to Nancy, she was ambivalent about the incident. At one level, Tom was part of her social-
civic network, so she was glad to help. Moreover, the incident had reduced crime in the area, 
which she determinedly supported. Ultimately, however, she was ‘really irritated’ by the infor-
mal collectivization of Innocent’s services. Paying for a private security guard was no small fi-
nancial commitment for Nancy (Nancy interview July 2011). This, then, was a case of contested 
collectivization. Significantly, Nancy had not mediated between her neighbour and her private 
security provider: as Innocent was permanently posted on their road, he had formed his own so-
cial networks, which had shaped his actions in this instance. This contrasts with Geoff and Ra-
chel’s case, where a subscriber played a gate-keeping role to private security services. 
Thus, informal collectivization was a highly contingent act. It did not spring from any shared vi-
sion of alternative citizenship or avid communitarianism.xiii In this sense, we are seeing a funda-
mentally unstable act that was subject to contestation: whilst free-riding in its most passive sense 
was difficult to eliminate, anything involving more proactive responses had to be offered or ne-
gotiated between subscribers, contractors and would-be recipients. Informal collectivization was 
the product of friendship and favour, not obligation. But as such, these acts were revealing of the 
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social networks that operated in Berea and became entangled with the private provision of polic-
ing.  
 
‘IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN IN THIS SECTOR’: PARTICIPATION IN POLICING ORGANI-
SATIONS AND FORMATIONS 
In their work on everyday policing, Buur and Jensen (2006) distinguish between participation in 
‘policing organisations’ and participation in less structured, more ephemeral, ‘policing for-
mations’. Participation in formations and organisations in predominantly white areas has re-
ceived little academic attention and was often overlooked by residents themselves.5 This was 
particularly true when participation involved the violence: ‘taking the law into your own hands’, 
many argued, was something that happened elsewhere. Implicitly and explicitly, this ‘elsewhere’ 
was the country’s black townships, which were still associated with the ‘mob violence’ and 
‘kangaroo courts’ of apartheid (Buur 2009, Cooper-Knock 2014). In contrast, the white residents 
of Berea portrayed themselves as privileged, elitist and isolationist but not civically active, nor 
unlawful and violent. A typical portrayal of Berea was given by Carol, a self-employed resident 
in her forties who lived with her family in the sector: 
Berea is your traditional white exclusive neighbourhood with a mentality from before 
1994 that is we are owed something, we do not have to give anything back; we have to 
pay and there is nothing more that is required... People are not prepared to get their hands 
dirty. Everyone here has a gardener to do their garden, they have a maid to do their laun-
dry… They are actually not prepared to attend a [CPF] meeting …Then they will have an 
armed robbery [and]… emigrate [or] complain about the crime. (Carol interview June 
2010) 
Carol raises two insightful points here: first, many Berea residents could afford to buy their way 
out of civic responsibility and compensate privately for failures in state delivery. Second, hardly 
any residents regularly participated in the local CPF. However, this did not mean that policing 
was utterly outsourced, nor that residents lacked what might be termed a ‘civic reflex’. 
There were two key policing organisations in Berea, which tried and failed to attract participa-
tion from residents. The first was a neighbourhood watch, which pre-dated the transition, and 
was somewhat sidelined by the advent of CPFs. Previously, its members had patrolled the area in 
                                                 
5 Although this may be changing, as the issue has received more substantive attention of late. See, for example, 
http://www.zapiro.com/cartoon/2458704-141207st#.VItC1WSsU2I accessed on 7th December 2014. 
cars but now, as violent crime was perceived to have increased (along with the price of petrol), 
the patrols had ceased. Aside from issuing a quarterly newsletter for local residents, and running 
‘maid watch’ sessions, the watch was largely inactive and had considered dissolution. Although 
local residents encouraged it to stay in operation, there was no increase in the watch’s member-
ship or activities and, as I left the field, its future seemed uncertain (Patricia interview July 2011; 
Peter interview August 2011). 
The second body was the local CPF. As mentioned above, CPFs emerged in the transition from 
apartheid. They were initially envisaged as citizen-police interfaces at which security could be 
co-produced and police legitimacy restored (Brogden 2002; 2004; Dixon 2007; Gordon 2001; 
2006). Policing approaches have since shifted towards state-centric models, but police stations 
remain legally obliged to establish and run these forums. Berea’s CPF had a local reputation as a 
‘talk shop’ or, in the words of one past executive member, ‘a melting pot of nothingness’ (Lola 
interview July 2011). Whilst the police representatives were amicable, they saw the forum as a 
space for receiving information, not direction, and for ‘educating’ residents. However, attendees 
had little useful information on crime: Usually, CPF attendance rose when a crime occurred (per-
sonally or locally) – it represented a reflex response to reach out to the state when the limitations 
of private security became apparent. However, like a reflex, this outreach was short-lived and 
CPF attendance dissipated as fast as citizens became disillusioned and resentful of ‘responsibili-
sation’ (Garland 2001) by the police, taking this as evidence of further state inaction. 
Carol herself had been a CPF co-chair for almost a year, but had recently resigned when we 
spoke. Like many others, she had begun attending after falling victim to crime (in her case an 
armed house robbery). This crime had convinced her husband that they needed to move into the 
secured estate, Mount Edgecombe. Carol had joined the CPF to seek alternative strategies for 
everyday policing, so that her family might feel safe remaining in Berea. When her efforts to 
mobilize local residents and shape police performance failed, she resigned. The couple has since 
moved north to a secured golfing estate. Carol’s story reminds us that whilst security estates can 
be spaces in which residents retreat from civic engagement (Durrington 2009), we cannot assume 
that these residents have been on a long or inevitable path towards such disengagement. Nor was 
the failure of structured activities in relatively affluent, predominantly white areas inevitable. In 
similar areas across Durban, I interviewed groups that actively patrolled on a regular basis, with 
scores of active members. In each of these cases, patrols operated in addition to, rather than in-
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stead of, private security. The failure of these structures in Berea, then, is contingent on more 
than the variables of ‘culture’ or class. 
Having explored policing organisations, let us turn to policing formations. A shared discourse 
existed on policing formations in Berea, which I will first explain and then critique. According to 
this public narrative, ‘taking the law into your own hands’ was something that happened else-
where, namely in formerly black townships, which residents associated with the operation of the 
‘sovereign mob’ (Buur 2008). As David argued, ‘there is a different conditioning in this sector 
that would allow the law to take its course… the average man is going to kick a would-be thief... 
on the property whereas he would probably be kicked quite badly elsewhere’ (David interview 
June 2011). This reticence emerged from residents’ unwillingness to ‘get their hands dirty’ – as 
we heard above - and their fear of being on the ‘wrong side’ of a law. Residents believed that 
whilst the SAPS were failing to tackle crime, they would successfully prosecute those who broke 
the law to tackle it themselves. In a few cases, these beliefs were bolstered by personal experi-
ence.  
Nancy, for example, was a middle-aged business owner in Berea. Driving home one afternoon, 
Nancy saw her private security guard - Innocent - being attacked by two men who had been try-
ing to steal a car from the street. Having ‘hooted’ to attract her neighbours’ attention she fled to 
her house to summon her armed response unit. When she returned, two male neighbours were 
‘helping the guard’ by hitting the suspects with their golf clubs until he fled. When Nancy took 
Innocent to the station to open charges against the suspects she was told she had insufficient evi-
dence against them. Instead, Nancy was ‘horrified’ to learn that her neighbours were themselves 
facing charges. ‘The victim is the citizen… not the baddy’, she concluded.  
Undoubtedly, the SAPS did sometimes seek to prosecute vigilante citizens, and not all acts of 
policing by residents were violent, but the dominant discourse that Nancy’s narrative supported 
did not reflect the complex and ambiguous reality of everyday policing in Berea. Other encoun-
ters suggested different possibilities. Graeme, for example, was a pastor at a local church. Like 
Ede, he witnessed a public display of violence against a criminal suspect. The outcome, however, 
was very different. On his way into work one morning, Graeme had stopped at the traffic lights 
behind another male driver and a woman on her bike. As the traffic lights changed, a young, 
black male knocked the woman from her bike and attempted to cycle away, with Graeme and the 
other driver giving chase. Ultimately, Graeme’s car blocked the would-be thief’s escape as the 
other driver left his car, chased the suspect down, knocked him from the bike, and began to as-
sault him. When a policeman arrived at the scene, he also gave the thief ‘a couple of slaps’. 
Graeme saw both responses as problematic but ‘understandable’ and did not believe either would 
face further repercussions (Fieldwork notes: July 2011). The discrepancy between Nancy and 
Graeme’s story reminds us of the inconsistent reactions of state actors to everyday policing. In 
interviews and informal conversations several local police officers appeared quietly frustrated 
with the limitations of legal violence. In the words of one relatively senior white police officer: ‘I 
would like to see more sjamboks (whips) used, but I cannot say that out loud’.  
Graeme’s account mirrored the accounts of other interviewees, who reported assaulting suspects 
before the Police arrived, in front of the Police, or with the Police, without legal consequence. 
So, why did this shared - narrative persist? As well as providing a flattering self-image, grounded 
in tropes of race and class, there were several reasons for its resilience.   
Firstly, when assaults did occur, they usually took place at the scene of the crime, inside people’s 
private fortresses.6 Consequently, many acts of everyday policing could be framed as lawful: 
Under South African law, citizens may ‘forcibly confine’ a suspect given ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
that they are committing, or have committed, a robbery (Criminal Procedures Act 1977, Act 51 
and the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2003, Act 3 and 4). They may also use proportional 
force in self-defence. These laws are open to fairly broad interpretation. In both cases, there is 
space for ‘deviance allowed by the rules’ (Brogden and Nijhar 1998:90) - behaviour that would 
be considered illegal were it not permitted by a legal loophole or a stretched legal definition. 
When does defence become aggression? When does confinement become assault? Most of the 
violence exercised by citizens against criminals occurred in this contested area. Geoff provides a 
good example of this ambiguity. Reflecting on his experiences, Geoff claimed that whilst he 
would not consider himself a vigilante, his actions had born the marks of vigilantism. The police, 
however, did not question his claim of self defence. 
Secondly, contrary to the experience of Ede and Graeme, most violence was hidden from view 
inside people’s houses.  This invisibility might strengthen people’s negotiation with the police: 
there were no witnesses presenting and supporting competing interpretations of events or push-
ing for alternative outcomes (Cooper-Knock 2014). By the same logic, however, such instances 
                                                 
6 Not least because thefts were often committed by strangers, who residents could not trace post facto. 
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of violence and negotiated impunity were not heard of by residents, making them appear less 
prevalent and less possible. Instead, residents were left reading of more publicly controversial 
cases in the media, where residents had been arrested (Jennifer Interview June 2010). This left 
residents like Lawrence with the impression that, in Berea, the Police ‘say you cannot take the 
law into your own hands. But the police in the townships they don’t do anything’. Only residents 
with long-running relationships with local police, it seems, had a sense of the parameters of im-
punity they could negotiate. 
Edmund, a middle-aged resident, was one such individual. He had recently arrived in Berea from 
another predominantly white suburb to the north of the city where, he claimed, ‘the only reason 
that there was no crime… was that I was like a vigilante. If people come and cause trouble you 
just come with a paintball gun, shoot them with a paintball gun, beat them with a baseball bat, do 
whatever’. In contrast to the ‘apathetic’ CPF, Barry claimed that he had taken action against the 
‘vagrants’ who were the source of local crime.  
Barry acted ‘like a vigilante’ in the absence of police action with no legal consequences, but he 
also recalled times he had acted in close cooperation with them.  Sometimes, his actions were 
reactive. Once, for example, Barry had found two people trying to break into his car. Having shot 
‘over their heads’ from the window he called the police. The K9 (dog) unit arrived and together 
they cornered the suspects at which point, Barry claimed, ‘the cops left the dogs to bite them 
from [sic] a long time before they went and got them’ (Barry interview August 2010).  
Elsewhere, he took a more proactive approach. For example, he conducted ‘raids’ on his local 
beach to ‘confront’ those who had built ‘shelters in the bushes’, explaining: “You have to be that 
aggressive and that frightening that that person will not come back’ (Barry interview August 
2010). Once Barry and his colleagues had confronted the ‘vagrants’, the police would take over.  
In South Africa, a court order is required to evict people from structures such as those on the 
beach (RSA 1998, Cooper-Knock 2008). By allowing Barry to enter into the area first, the police 
were outsourcing both illegal violence and illegal eviction to citizens who would be far harder to 
trace and hold accountable than uniformed officers. 7 
                                                 
7 It was such instances that led S’bu Zikode, the leader of shack dweller’s movement Abahlali baseMjondolo to de-
clare that, ‘Law or no law, powerful people can always win… they will go and tear down the shacks illegally but on 
 
 Clearly, some police allowed or facilitated space outside the law in which citizens could act. 
However, it was hard for citizens without working relationships with the police to know where 
these opportunities might emerge and how secure they might be.  This served to reinforce a pub-
lic narrative that depicted police officers as being eager to prosecute vigilante citizens, effective-
ly ensuring that local residents remained law-abiding. This narrative was an unreliable guide to 
everyday policing in Berea, but an insightful window into subjective understandings of state-
hood, citizenship, and everyday policing.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Everyday policing in Berea is far more complex than might be thought by those who see only the 
security architecture of the area. By exploring how people navigate and describe everyday polic-
ing in this sector, we better understand ongoing negotiations over security, statehood and citizen-
ship.  
Those I spoke to did not trust the state to prevent or resolve crime. The drivers of this mistrust 
were manifold: some felt that state actors were incompetent, others that these actors were active-
ly obstructive, either because they were economically corrupt, or racially prejudiced. Either way, 
this produced a sense of alienation from the state, which was often exacerbated by their contin-
ued need to harness the bureaucratic authority of the police to verify their victimization. Aliena-
tion from one actor or authority, however, does not guarantee allegiance to another. In this case, 
estrangement from the state did not make reliance on private security any easier. In Berea, those 
charged with maintaining the security and privilege of local residents also served as a constant 
reminder of the fears and insecurities that residents sought to ignore or escape. Moreover, whilst 
it is crucial to recognize citizens’ alienation from the state, it is equally important to 
acknowledge that this alienation was neither linear nor predictable, as the example of the case of 
Carol demonstrates. Nor was estrangement from the state seen as optimal or acceptable. For all 
                                                                                                                                                             
the other hand the poor are expected to obey the law’, http://democracyinafrica.org/predictability-everyday-
struggles-shack-dwellers-south-africa/, last accessed on 1st November 2014. 
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their state-like appearance, the economic contracts that private security companies offered were 
no match for a social one. 
Finally, the presence of private security did not preclude citizens from participating in everyday 
policing, individually or collectively. Firstly, as the informal collectivization of security high-
lights, private security did not just shape relations between citizens, it was also shaped by them. 
Secondly, in contrast to the narratives of local residents, some also engaged in policing without 
the mediation of private security providers. Such acts of policing frequently blurred or over-
stepped the bounds between legal and illegal violence. Both the discursive framing and empirical 
negotiation of these policing acts are revealing. Together, these insights highlight the importance 
of looking behind closed doors (or closed gates) to uncover the subtleties of citizen-state rela-
tions in the present, and understand the multitudinous ways in which the putative ‘social con-
tract’ might evolve in the future.  
 
                                                 
ENDNOTES 
i However, see Benit-Gbaffou (2008) and Marks and Bonnin (2010). 
ii All quotes taken from an interview with Geoff and Rachel in July 2010, and an interview with Geoff in 
June 2013. 
iii Westville Prison is the local prison in Durban. 
iv This was still better than the conviction rates in Johannesburg, which stood at 1.93%. Of course, we 
need to be wary of any uncritical reading of this crime statistics such as these critically, see Altbeker 
(2007). 
v Interestingly, the tensions did seem to focus on black, rather than Indian or coloured police.  
vi Dompas was the colloquial name for the passbook that black South Africans were forced to carry during 
apartheid. 
vii By the end of the 1980s, private security guards outnumbered state police, around 5:1 (Grant 1989:98; 
Scharf 1989:212). However, the SAPF was unusually small during this era, largely because homeland 
forces, special branch and auxiliary forces were excluded from its number (see Cawthra 1994). 
viii For more on the fear of crime, and its effect on practice, see Lupton and Tulloch (1999); Holloway and 
Jefferson (2000) and Pain and Shirlow (2003). In South Africa: Judd (1999) and Spinks (2001). 
ix On the importance of spectacle and statehood, see Wedeen (2009) 
x Emic term for metal bars over windows and doors to criminal access 
xi Benit-Gbaffou (2008a:1937; 2008b) talks of a similar ‘Domestic Workers Watch’ in Atholl, Johannes-
burg. 
xii Inspired by Hornberger’s (2004) term ‘informal privatisation’ used to describe the behaviour of inner-
city residents in Johannesberg who seek to capture the services of police officials for their own ends. 
xiii See Posel (2004) and Oomen (2004) on h alternative visions of citizenship driving everyday policing. 
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